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UNCERTAINTY AND THE FORMAL THEORY OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 
I ,  INTRODUCTION 
Since the publication of Downs's seminal book two decades 
ago, the concepts and theories that he introduced have led to a large 
and expanding literature on the theory of electoral competition and 
voter decision making. While some of this work has abandoned the 
assumption that voters have perfect information about candidates' 
issue positions (see Shepsle, 1972) , nearly all of it assumes that 
candidates know how the voters will respond when any given platform 
is offered. Yet many empirical works on congress and the presidency 
find that political decision makers are uncertain about the response 
of voters to their actions (see Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963;
Kingdon,· 1973),  and claim that this fact is fundamental to under­
standing their behavior. 
This paper explores the neglected issue of candidate 
uncertainty, It examines the strategic decision making of candidates 
in duopolistic elections in which they are uncertain about the out­
comes of majority rule decisions in pairwise contests of alternative 
positions on political issues. 
Part of the motivation for this paper lies in the relatively 
unrobust predictions of existing theoretical models of political 
campaigns. It is well known that the likelihood of cyclic 
majorities is very high if individual preferences are randomly 
distributed over all possible orderings of the relevant alterna­
tives (see DeMeyer and Plott, Kramer) , As a result, Downs 
predicted that without severe restrictions on the manner in which 
alternatives are put before the electorate,  political outcomes 
should be unstable. The winning issue position and candidate 
in one election should be defeated in the next; further with 
certainty of defeat facing incumbents , the connection between 
actions after an election and campaign positions before the 
election could be expected to be slight , 
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Even if there are no cycles under majority rule, equally 
implausible predictions arise. If a single majority-rule winning 
position is known to exist , both candidates will take it, and 
voters will be indifferent as to who wins. Elections will end in 
ties and voters will have no incentive to vote, 
Collective choice theory based upon rational individual 
behavior can be extended in two ways to make its predictions more 
in line with reality. The first , which we wili not explore here, 
is to constrain each candidate's feasible set of election strategies 
in such a way that majority rule cycles are not exploited ,-/
-1For example, candidates might care about the positions they
take for reasons other than the impact of positions on election 
outcomes, might have monopoly rights to some issue positions 
(e.g. party identification, incumbency, etc.) , or might be 
constrained in their selection of strategies by the past behavior 
of themselves or of other candidates of the same party. 
A second possible motivation for stable yet different 
platform choices is that candidates may have conflicting beliefs 
about voter behavior, If information is costly enough that they 
cannot obtain new information too easily , strategic equilibria 
could exist which vanish in the absence of uncertainty. 
In this paper , we assume that two candidates , engaged 
in a duopolistically competitive election, wage a campaign that 
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can be represented as a two-person game. The strategies of the 
game are
' 
the elements of the feasible set of alternatives that can 
be put before the electorate. A candidate selects one of the . set 
of alternatives , and the election consists of a majority rule 
choice by the electorate of one of the two alternatives offere4 by 
the candidates. Each alternative can be interpreted as a vector 
of positions on the issues in a campaign. Although in reality the 
set of feasible alternatives may differ between two candidates , in 
order to investigate the implications of uncertainty alone we 
assume throughout that any alternative may be offered by either 
candidate. 
At least one candidate is assumed to be unsure of the 
majority rule outcome of at least some of the pairwise contests of 
alternatives. A candidate deals with this uncertainty by estimating 
�he likely outcome of the uncertain contests , based upon whatever 
information he has about the distribution of opinion. If the 
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candidates differ with respect to the amount of information they 
have and the manner in which they process this information, the 
expectations of the candidates about the outcome of a particular 
pairwise contest can differ. In fact , if opinions are sufficiently · 
different , both candidates might expect to win an election involving 
some particular choice of strategies by each candidate. 
In the presence of uncertainty , candidates . might wish to 
acquire additional knowledge about voter preferences before 
selecting a strategy. An obvious mechanism for obtaining this 
knowledge is the public opinion poll.-1 One issue examined in this
_/Two generic types of polls are possible. A candidate could
take a hypothetical poll by asking voters to state a preference 
for one of the two issue positions, without either position being 
taken by or identified with a particular candidate. Or a candidate 
could gauge the response of the electorate to an issue position by 
expounding a position publicly and then using the change in his 
standing in a popularity poll to estimate the effect. of the position 
on his electability. In this paper we abstract for the differences 
in these polls. 
paper is the desirability to a candidate of acquiring better 
information about the true response of an electorate to a particular 
strategy pair. 
The key element in the following analysis is the observa­
tion that uncertainty about electoral behavior can alter the game 
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theoretic structure of the campaign. A campaign in which outcomes 
are known with certainty must be a game of perfect opposition since 
payoffs must be symmetric (one person's win is another person's 
loss) . But ex ante, two candidates can both expect to win if at 
least one is uncertain about the true social preference relation. 
In such a milieu, information can have a negative value, in the 
same sense that information about the true outcome of a football 
game before bets are placed can reduce the welfare of both of the 
participants in a wager. Both bettors on the outcome of a football 
game, if their bets are consistent with their own subjective 
probabilities over possible states of the world, believe ex ante 
that more information is more likely to confirm their own beliefs 
than those of the other person, and hence both would believe that 
more information would be likely to cause the other person to 
change his mind about entering the bet. Translated to campaign 
decision making, this means that under some circumstances, 
depending upon the structure of their subjective expectations about 
electoral behavior, both candidates can attach a negative value t� 
certain kinds of information since both expect that this informa­
tion would only cause the pre-poll equilibrium· strategy selections 
to be upset in a manner that runs counter to the preceived self­
interest ·of each. 
II. THE MODEL AND SOME EXAMPLES
In this section we formalize what is meant by partial or 
incomplete · information. In an electoral campaign each. candidate 
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communicates a sequence of messages to the electorate and the 
opponent. Somehow these messages are decoded by the voters in 
order to determine how '(or whether) to cast their votes on election 
day. Voters may, of course, ignore many of the messages and 
"misinterpret" some as well, but when the campaign concludes they 
either vote for some candida�e or abstain. The electorate can 
be viewed in aggregate as a function mapping sequences ·of messages 
from the candidates as well as other information into a distribu­
tion of votes for the candidates. This function can be represented 
as a matrix, with the rows being the strategies available to one 
candidate, the columns being the strategies open to the second 
contestant, and the elements indicating whether candidate one won, 
tied or lost the election run on that strategy . pair. We call such 
a function a majority dominance relation. 
In this paper voters are assumed to respond only to the 
most recent message in the sequence, These messages may be thought 
of as "issue positions" or "platforms. " Further,. the electorate 
is assumed to respond in an unbiased manner to the· announced 
platforms of candidates. That is, if two candidates switch 
platforms their vote totals switch. 
Suppose that the candidates are not certain which of many 
possible majority dominance relations truly represents·the electorate. 
Given a set of three platforms (x, y, z) , a total of 27 outcome 
matrices may reflect the electorate's true response to all possible 
campaigns. 
This situation may be represented as a game by regarding 
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the matrix representation of each majority dominance relation as a 
symmetric, two-person, zero-sum game. Each element of such a matrix 
is +l, O ,  or -1 according to whether the candidate playing the rows 
candiate A -- wins, ties or loses an election run on the cor-
responding pair of strategies. 
Suppose that the candiates do not know which majority 
dominance relation is true, but uses the information available to 
them to produce a subjective probability distribution over all the 
possible dominance relations. Each candidate then selects an 
election strategy on these beliefs, 
The reason for introducing alternative states of the world 
and probabilities over them, rather than hypothesizing payoff 
matrices directly, is to permit some generality in discussing the 
roll of information. In particular, this formulation permits 
better information about the outcome of one strategy pair to 
influence·other elements of the payoff matrix in a systematic 
fashion', as will be shown in Section III. 
The following example illustrates the candidate game 
resulting from our assumptions. Assume that the candidates, A and 
. B, have subjective probabilities, P! and P�, over k = 4 possible 
states of the world as follows: 
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State of the World I II 
pk 1 1 
A 4 2 
pk 1 0 B 4
[ 
-1. 
J p 
1 
-] Payoff Matrix 0 0 1 -1 1 
State of the World III IV 
pk 1 0 A 4 
pk 1 1 
B 2 4 
[-: 
1 
-1] [ 
-1 
] Payoff Matrix 0 -1 0 1 0 -1 
Assuming both candidates are expected value maximizers, candidate 
A behaves as if he were playing the following game, which is 
constructed by summing the state of the world matrices by the P!'s, 
and denoted PA • 
0 l 1 2 2 
I 
p 
= 
1 0 -1 A -2 
1 1 0 -2 
By similar construction, B is playing: 
0 0 1 -2 
PB 0 0 
1 
-2 
1 1 0 2 2 
Essentially what has happened is that uncertainty has transformed 
the candidate game into a nonzero sum game. The elements of PA
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and PB' when incremented by one and divided by two, are respectively;
A's and B's subjective probabilities that A will win. The unique 
pure strategy equilibrium point in this game is for candidate A 
to play platform (row) one and candidate B to play platform 
(column)· three. The value of the game to A is t and the value to 
1 B is -2 (i.e. , both believe they are likely to win the election).
If both candidates know that the true state of the world 
is state I, the minimax strategy for each is to play each platform 
1 with probability 3• The value of the game will then be zero for 
both candidates, The introduction of uncertainty has created a pure 
strategy· equilibrium and has made the value of the game positive for 
both candidates. This example would seem to capture the essential 
idea that Downs had in claiming that uncertainty could create 
stability in electoral competition. Of course, it is easy to come 
up with a case in which the opposite phenomenon occurs. The true 
state of the world might be II, which has a pure strategy equili­
brium, while both candidates might believe that all states are 
equally likely, in which case the equilibrium strategy is to play 
each strategy with probability l· 
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A few important principles may be drawn from this very 
simple model. First, disagreement between the candidates can create 
new equilibria. SeconJ, new information that changes the beliefs 
of the candidates can upset equilibria. Third, equilibria can 
have the property that the candidates adopt different platforms. 
This last phenomenon cannot.occur in a classical spatial model unless
the electoral response function is biased or the candidates place 
value on.features of an election other than who wins. 
While it is of interest to note that uncertainty may 
generate stable platform choices, it is perhaps even more surprising 
to learn that uncertainty may induce candidates to collude with 
each other. The following applications of some simple strategic 
structures that can arise in two-person games illustrate this points. 
A "P.risoner' s Dilemma 11 Cameaign 
Suppose candidates A and B accord subjective probabilities 
over four possible states of the world as follows: 
State of the World I II 
pk 
A • 7 .2 
pk 
B .OS .os 
[-: 
1 
-�] [� 
I 1 
]0 0 -1 1 -1 
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State of the World III IV 
pk 
. A .05 .05 
pkB .7 .2  
[-: 
1 
] [_: 
0 -:] 0 0 -1 -1 1 
The resulting expected payoff matrix, · written in bimatrix form, is 
then : [( O, O) 
PAB = (-.95, -.8) 
(- .6, -. 9 ) 
(.95, ,8) 
o, 0) 
.5, - .5) 
( .6, -. 9)] 
(-. 5, .5) 
o, 0) 
Recall that A seeks positive payoffs and B negative. This game 
is a prisoner's dilemma with payoff (O, O), corresponding to each 
candidate �aking the first platform. Each would be better off if 
the candidates played platform pair (three, two) , But if the 
candidates were to take this latter position and obtain (.5, -,5)
each would have an incentive to switch to platform one. 
This sort of strategic structure might underlie a tacit 
or explicit agreement between two candidates not to campaign on a 
certain issue. Both candidates agree in this case that platform 
one is the most popular platform among the voters. Candidate A' s 
beliefs are such that he thinks that platform one is unbeatable 
with probability .8, there is a cycle with probability .2 .  Mr . B 
believes that with probability .95 platform one is unbeatable. 
Precisely because they agree that platform one is popular, they 
would prefer to agree to restrict the campaign to platforms two 
and three over which their beliefs conflict. 
Scholars and editorialists have sometimes observed that 
an issue about which the public holds strong beliefs (bussing or 
corruption in office, for �xample) failed to arise in a campaign, 
This phenomenon is usually ascribed to the presence or absence of 
the candidates' "public responsibility. " But the prisoner's 
dilemma example indicates that the failure of a "dominant" issue 
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to arise could be due to the same phenomenon that leads bettors not 
to wager on football games about which their expectations are 
identical. If so, "public responsibility" is
. 
really quite some­
thing else -- collusion to prevent a public policy that is a clear 
majority rule winner, 
The implications of these phenomena for democratic theory 
depend; of course, on·the ability of candidates to make and enforce 
agreements on campaign strategies. This ability depends, among 
other things, on the cost of information to the candidates, as is 
demonstrated in Section III, It also depends upon. each candidate 
knowing the ranking by the opponent of alternative campaigns in the 
subset of possibilities that constitutes the pris0ner' s dilemma. 
In the absence of this knowledge, the candidates will not perceive 
the possibility of advantageous collusion. 
A "Battle of the Sexes11 Campaign 
Another set of incentives can arise if the candidates have 
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somewhat different beliefs. For example, assume that the candidates 
put all subjective probability on the following five states of the 
world : 
pk 1 3 3 A 4 8 8 0 0 
pk 1 0 0 1 1 B 4 2 4 
I II III IV v [_: +: �:] [
+
:
-
: �:] [
+
:
-
: �:] [-: +: ::] [-: +: ::J 
+l +l 0 -1 +l 0 +l +l 0 -1 -1 0 +l -1 0 
The expected payoff matrix is then the following: [( o, 0) 1 1 
:J 
( -2· +1) ( -4, O) 
PAB = (+!, -1) o, 0) ( -1, +t> 
0) 1 ( O, O) (+4. ( +l, -2> 
This game has two pure strategy equilibria, strategy pairs (two, one) 
and (three, two) , with payoffs <t. -1) and (1, -t> . Candidate B
prefers the first , and candidate A the second, producing the 
battle of the sexes structure discussed in Luce and Raiffa, The 
important feature of this expected payoff matrix is disagreement 
over which equilibrium should be achieved could lead to strategies 
and threats that produce disequilibrium outcomes, 
The information structure that produces this result has 
two elements : candidates differ in their assessment of the likely 
outcome of two strategy pairs, and the strategy pair about which 
the first candidate is more certain is the one about which the 
second candidate is le�s certain. In this case, candidate B is 
certain that if the electorate is faced with a choice between 
platforms one and two, one will prevail. Candidate A is less 
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certain about the outcome of this contest, but believes the outcome 
is likely to be the opposite of B's belief. Similarly, A is 
certain that platform three would beat platform two i� a pairwise 
contest, while candidate B is less sure of the outcome of such a 
contest, but disagrees with A. Each would prefer to fight the 
campaign on platforms which appear to guarantee victory rather than 
take a chance, 
III, POLLS AND INFORMA TION 
Candidates who are uncertain about the behavior of voters 
on election day may find it worthwhile to seek information about 
the preferences of the electorate. This section examines some 
conditions under which information would be valuable to candidates. 
We restrict ourselves to a particular class of information-gathering 
processes which we call, suggestively, polls. 
We define a poll as information about the true value of 
the cells of the subjective probability matrices PA and PB defined
in Section II. A poll is private if only one of the candidates 
learns the result. If both candidates learn of the true value, 
the poll is called public. We assume that the outcomes of polls 
are certain so that if a public poll is taken, the corresponding 
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elements of PA and PB are replaced by 1 or -1. This hypothesis may,
of course, be relaxed. In particular, the outcome of the poll 
could be a probability of victory anywhere from zero to one, 
depending upon the nature and timing of the poll. Considering 
outcomes other than 1 or -1 greatly complicates the examples 
considered in this section, but does not change the essence of the 
results. 
Candidates are assumed to revise their subjective .prob-
abilities in a Bayesian manner. That is, if a poll is taken on a 
particular element of the matrix of outcomes of strategy pairs, 
each candidate revises his probability estimates over the possible 
majority dominance relation in a manner that assigns all probability 
to the subset of majority dominance relationships consistent with 
the poll and that increases the probability assigned to each 
relationship in that set by the same proportion,-/
-'Pol� outcomes between 1 and -1 would assign probabilities
such that the expected outcome of the polled cell equaled the poll 
result, with probabilities assoicated with matrices having entries' 
of a given sign in the polled cell incremented or decremented 
proportionately. 
The following example illustrates the effects of a poll 
on the subjective probability matrices and the equilibrium pair of 
strategies. This example is based upon the first example presented 
in Section II, in which, before a poll is to be taken, the only 
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pure strategy equilibrium is for A to play platform one and B to 
1 1 play three, with payoff vector <2• -2>, Suppose· that a poll is to 
be taken on element (one, two) , The following table gives the 
revised subjective probabilities, strategies and outcomes for both 
candidates, given that the true value of (one, two) is either +l or 
-1. 
Poll result 
State of the World 
Equilibrium strategy 
of A 
Equilibrium strategy 
of B 
Payoff to A 
Payoff to B 
I 
0 
0 
True Value of (1, 2) 
1 -1 
II III IV I II III IV 
2 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 
(1, o, 0) (O, o, 1) 
(O, o, 1) (0, 1, O)
1 1 3 
-1 0 
In this case after the poll A's expected return either drops to.!3 
or rises to 1, depending on the outcome of the poll. A's ex ante 
expectation of the change in the value of the game due to the poll 
is the sum of these outcomes weighted by the subjective proba-
3 1 1 1 bilities over the possible results of the poll, e. g. 4( -6)+4<2)
= O. That is, A is indifferent between having a poll and not having 
one. In this particular example, B is also indifferent about a 
public poll on (one, two). 
A rather surprising result occurs if a public poll is 
proposed on (one, three) , Going through the same operations as 
above, the � ante evaluations of this poll are negative for both 
candidates , In particular, the expected payoff of the game to 
candidate A drops by .]__ if a poll is taken 
20 
Mr. B is forced to surrender an additional 
on (one, three) while 
s _I 
TZ In this case,
-1The poll result +l leads to a mixed strategy by both 
candidates. 
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both candidates are ·better off� ante if they can prevent a public 
poll on this element. As it turns out, this "ignorance is bliss" 
phenomenon occurs under fairly general circumstances. Section IV 
establishes sufficient conditions for both candidates to prefer 
preventing a public opinion poll on a given strategy pair. For 
the present we restrict our attention to some illustrative examples 
that provide a little insight into the effect on campaign strategy 
of increasing the amount of information held by candidates in an 
uncertain election. 
The prisoner's dilemma ex�mple in Section II was con-
structed to show that uncertainty may induce candidates to behave 
in rather curious and, one might say, unfortunate ways. We now 
consider the possibility that, rather thari forming their strategies 
on the basis of limited information, one or the �ther of the candidates 
might choose to purchase additional information or that a third 
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party -- a polling agency -- might introduce new information to the 
candidates. 
The impact of a public poll on cell (three, two), the 
collusive outcome of the prisoner's dilemma, depends upon whether 
the candidates are colluding. .If the candidates collude their 
1 1 expected pre-poll payoff is <2• -2) , If a public poll is taken on
(three, two) and Bayesian updating takes place, the expected post-
1 3 poll payoff is (4, -4) so that, given pre-poll collusion, candidate
A would oppose a poll while candidate B would favor it. If, on the 
other hand, the candidates failed to collude, both players would 
favor a public poll on (three, two). 
The effects of a private poll are less clear because of 
the possibility of strategic behavior with respect to the selective 
release of private poll results, If Mr. B takes a private poll on . 
(three, two), regardless of the outcome the best strategy is to 
choose platform one, But candidate A, still being in the dark about 
the outcome of the poll, will interpret B's choice as an unwilling­
ness to collude. In the absence of information, he may switch to 
platform one, But if candidate B thinks that A will react in this 
manner, and if before the poll the collusive outcome is chosen, B 
will find the poll information valueless. 
Another possibility can also arise. If the result of a 
public poll on (three, two) is -1, the post-poll equilibrium is for 
A to choose platform three and B to play platform one, with payoff 
(1, -1). Mr. B could take a private poll and, if the outcome is 
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-1, publicize it and play platform one while, if it is +l, suppress 
the information and switch to platform one, In this case, assuming 
that A believes the information that B distributes, he will choose 
platform three when B announces the poll result and the choice of 
platform one, but will play one if B picks platform one without 
announcing the result of the poll. If B adopts this strategy his 
3 expected payoff to a private poll is -4 , just what he would have
obtained had a public poll occurred. · 
The "battle of the sexes" example illustrates still 
another strategic aspect of information. One possibility is .for 
one candidate to threaten the other with the possibility of buying 
more information as a device to force the strategy pair he prefers. 
In this example, candidate B can threaten to undertake a poll on 
the pairwise contest, platform two versus platform one, the results 
of which are as follows. 
Poll on (two, one) - (one, two) 
Result = -1 ====* 
I II III IV v 
pk 
A 1 0 0 0 0 
pk 1 0 0 1 1 B 4 2 4 [( o, O) (+1, +l) (-1, ·1 
PAB (-1 -1) ( O, O) (-1, +t> 
(+1 : O) 1 ( O, O) (+1, -2> 
Equilibrium (three, two) , payoff 1 (+1, -2>
Result 
Expected 
Expected 
+1 � 
I II III IV v 
pk 0 1 1 0 0 A 2 2
pk 0 1 1 0 0 B 2 2[( o, O) (-1, -1) ( o, ·1I PAB (+1, +1) ( O, O) (-1, -1) ( o, 0) (+1, +1) ( o, 0) 
Equilibrium (three, three), payoff (O, O) 
Payoff 
Payoff 
1 3 1 to A with Poll= 4(+1) + 4(0) = 4
1 1 to B with Poll = 1(- 2> + 0(0) = - 2 
If A refuses to play B's preferred platform pair (two 
versus one), steadfastly sticking to platform three, B expects to 
lose nothing by polling on (two, one) ; however, A would stand to 
suffer a substantial loss, The worst A can do without a poll is 
1 platform pair (two, one) with payoff + 2• which is.preferable to
the expected result of the threatened poll. 
In this example, A has no effective information threat 
comparable to B's. Although the calculations are not presented 
here, it is easily shown that polls on the other two off-diagonal 
strategy pairs produce ambiguous results that do no more damage 
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to B than to A. Likewise, A has no effective counterthreat to B ' s  
threat to poll on (two, one). Thus, in this example, the strategic 
21 
threat to gather new information resolves the ambiguity in the 
battle of the sexes campaign, creating a stable equilibrium. 
IV. THE FORMAL MODEL 
We assume that candidates select campaign strategies from 
a finite set of X alternatives, X = {a, b, c, • • •  , y, z} and that 
each of a finite number, n, of voters has preferences on X that 
weakly order the alternatives. Let n(xPy) be the number of.voters 
preferring strategy x to strategy y. We define xMy if and only if 
n(xPy) > n(yPx), and call M the majority dominance relation. 
Numerous .majority dominance relations are possible, of course, over 
any set of alternatives. Any particular majority dominance relation 
can be represented as a symmetric, two-person, zero-sum game with 
a payoff matrix defined as follows : {l if n(xPy) > n(yPx) 
A(x, y) = 0 if n(xPy) n(yPx) 
1 if n(yPx) > n(xPy) 
Each candidate has a matrix of expected payoffs, PA for .
candidate A and PB for candidate B, which gives the expected payoff
for each combination qf platforms. Candidates are assumed to select 
Nash equilibria in choosing strategies. The interpretation of the 
payoff matrices that was given in Section II was that : 
k where K·contains the indexes over states of the world, M is a 
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skew-symmetric matrix representing the majority dominance relation 
in a possible state of the world, and P! is
.
A's subjective proba­
bility that state k will occur. We assume that the elements of 
Mk are zero on the diagonal and +l or -1 off the diagonal. As long
as each element in PA is less than or equal to 1 in absolute value,
a probability distribution {p.!} exists such that PA can be expressed
as in the above equation, so that no loss of generality is entailed 
k · I by preventing off diagonal elements of M from being zero.-
-'Proved in an unpublished appendix, available from the authors
on request, 
The first theorem illustrates how uncertainty can lead to 
pure equilibrium strategies ·even if both candidates agree that the 
majority dominance relation contains a cycle. 
Theorem 11 Suppose in a three-platform election each candidate 
assigns subjective probabilities to majority dominance relations 
such that the expected payoff matrix of each is cyclic; The 
campaign has a pure strategy equilibrium involving two of the cycling 
elements if, and only if, the candidates disagree about which order 
of the cycle is more likely. 
The formal proof of Theorem 1 follows from two observations : 
(1) cycles occur when off-diagonal elements of the payoff matrix alter­
nate in sign, and (2) pure strategy . equilibria require that the payoff
for the equilibrium campaign exceed zero for both candidates, since 
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either candidate can guarantee a zero payoff by playing the same 
strategy as the opponent. It can easily be shown that these require­
ments yield the proof of the theorem. 
For a strategy pair satisfying Theorem 1 to be an 
equilibrium in the larger campaign depends upon the structure of 
subjective probabilities over outcomes of contests involving other 
strategies and, consequently, of the entire nature of subjective 
payoff expectation , One interesting case is the following, 
Corollary 1. 1. In an n > 3 platform election, if three issues are 
known to•cycle, the conditions of Theorem 1 obtain for cycling 
issues, and the candidates agree qualitatively on the outcome of 
all campaigns other than those involving the cycling elements, 
then strategy pairs satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1 are the 
only ones that give both candidates the expectation of winning. 
Proof, Let (a, b, c) be the cycling platforms. Since for all 
strategies (r, .s) + (a, b, c) and r </< s the candidates agree that 
either r P s or s P r, each pair must be associated with an 
expectation of losing ·  on the part of one candidate. 
Q. E. D. 
The strategy pair of Corollary 1. 1 will not be a pure 
strategy equilibrium, however, unless the structure of the game is 
s�ch that neither candiate, given the choice of strategy by his 
opponent, has a strategy of greater expected payoff (e. g_. , a 
prisoner's dilemma situation). If, for example, both candidates 
agree that strategy r • (a, b, c) defeats all three cycling 
strategies, and if one C.9.ndidate chooses his element of (x, y) 
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satisfying Theorem 1, the other can guarantee a win by playing r 
rather than his element of (x, y), Only collusion between candidates 
can then result in a campaign run on platform pair (x, y). 
Define a full transitive subordering of a cyclic ordering over 
a set as being a transitive ordering of all the elements of the set 
that is consistent with the cyclic ordering. For example, the 
cycle xPyPzPx contains three full transitive suborderings : 
xPyPz, yPzPx and zPxPy. 
Also, define the inverse of a transitive ordering as being the same 
ordering but with the direction of preferences reversed, e. g. the 
inverse of xPyPz is zPyPx, Finally, define an n-element cycle as 
a cycle of the form a1Pa2P , PanPa1 for n �· 3.
If the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied, the three­
dimensional game has three pure strategy equilibria, one for each 
pairwise contest. The resulting game resembles the "Battle of the 
Sexes'' structure discussed in the preceeding section, We offer 
without proof the following obvious c�rollary : 
Corollary 1. 2 :  A sufficient condition for the three-dimensional, 
two candidate campaign of Theorem 1 to have the structure of the 
"Battle of the Sexes" game is that both candidates believe that 
the payoff matrix is cyclic, that the candidates disagree about the 
2S 
order of the cycle, and that 
The last condition of the theorem requires that, although 
the candidates disagree whether particular transitive orderings 
(Ri and Rj) or their inverses (Ri+J' Rj+J) are more likely, the
ranking of transitive orderings by A according to the likelihood 
that each represents the time state of the world is not the same as 
the ranking by B of the inverse orderings. If the conditions of 
Corollary 1. 2 are generalized to include positive subject proba­
bilities for cycling majority dominance relations, the corollary 
remains true if i and j are allowed to vary over the three transitive 
orderings within a cycle and the cycle itself , 
Just as the certainty that a cycle exists does not preclude 
a pure strategy equilibrium involving the cycling elements, the 
certainty that no cycle exists does not preclude the possibility 
that the payoff matrix facing the candidates contains a cycle. 
Theorem 2. A candidate who believes that cycles are not possible 
will face an n-element cycle in his subjective payoff matrix for the 
campaign if, and only if, every full transitive subordering of the 
n-element cycle is regarded as more likely than its inverse ordering. 
Proof. If P is a complete, inflexive relation, every n > 3 element 
cycle contains a three.element subcycle, so that the theorem need 
only be proved for the three element ·case, Suppose a, b, and c are 
the three strategies. Candidate A believes that only transitive 
majority dominance relations are possible, and for three elements 
these are : 
Rl : aPbPc
R2 .: bPcPa
�3 : 
cPaPb
R4 : cPbPa
RS : aPcPb
R6 : bPaPc
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Note that R1, R2 and R3 
are the full transitive suborderings of cycle
c1 : aPbPcPa ; R4, RS 
and R6 are the full transitive suborderings of
cycle c2 : aPcPbPa; R4, RS 
and R6 are the inverse orderings of R1,
R2 and R3 ; and c1 and c2 are the only three-element cycles that are
possible. 
subjective 
a 
p = A b
Using the notation introduced above, candidate A, with 
i probabilities PA over the Ri, faces a payoff matrix :
0 1 2 3 4 s 6 PA-PA+PA-PA+PA-PA 
1 2 3 4 s '6PA-Pp;-PA-PA
+PA+PA
-Pl+P2-P3+P4-PS-P6 A A A A A A 0
Pl+P2-P3-P4-PS+P6A A A A A A 
c -Pl+P2+P3+P4-PS+P6 A A A A A A 
-Pl-P2+P3+P4+PS-P6 A A A A A A 0
PA contains a cycle over' {a, b,
 c} if and only if the off-diagonal
elements of PA have alternating sign, or :
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
pl 
_ 
p2 + p3 _ p4 + PS A A A A A p
6 > 0 4=9 A 
pl + p2 
_ P3 _ p4 _ PS + p6 > O A A A A A A '
Pairwise combinations of these inequalities produces the 
following equivalent relations : 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
p3 -A 
p6 > 
A o�
pl -
A 
p4 > 0 A � 
p2 _ PS > A A o. 
Similarly, linear combinations of (4), (S) and (6) can 
be constructed that yield (1), (2) and (3). Hence PA cycles on
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· {a, b, c} if and only if (4), (S) and (6) are all true or all false ,
Q.E. D. 
The conditions of Theorem 2 are strong, as examination of 
the Ri demonstrates. For example, assume that Candidate A believes
R1 is the mos� likely of the six orderings listed above, For a CY.Cle
to come about in his payoff matrix, he must also believe P! > P:.
Now R6 differs from R1 only by interchanging the first two elements,
while R3 moves the last-place finisher in R1 to first place. Thus,
the conditions of the theorem require that A believe that if he is 
wrong about R1, it is more likely to be because the last place
element really ranks first while the others retain their relative 
orderiµg than because he was wrong about the ordering of adjacent 
elements in the ordering R1 -- i.e., it is less likely ·that· b is
28 
preferred to a than it is that c, the third place element in the 
most likely relation, is preferred to both a and b. 
Theorems 1 anu 2 demonstrate that there is no direct 
connection between whether candidates behave as if the majority 
dominance relation is known to be cyclic and whether they believe 
it is cyclic. If a cycle results because the conditions of Theorem 
2 are met, Theorem 1 may still be satisfied, A pure strategy 
equilibrium is still possible if the candidates do not agree which 
cycle has the property that its transitive suborderings are all more 
likely than their inverses. 
The remainder of this section explores the process by which 
candidates gather information about the majority dominance relation-
ship and alter their strategies accordingly. 
A poll supplies information about the true value of the 
ij ij poll�d cell, PA and PB of the matrices PA' PB, and by symmetry,
the obverse elements of the payoff matrix, According to assumption, 
after a poll P!j and Pij are replaced by 1 or -1, depending upon
which certain outcome transpires, 
After a poll, candidates update their subjective proba­
bility distributions in a Bayesian manner, If a poll is taken on 
th the ij� element and candidate A learns that the true value of this
element is x E {1,-1}, then for all k such that M�j = x,
subjectively possible : 
k 
k* PAp = --. A I: p -<-
.feL A 
if Pij = x is A 
where L .. {k lMi� '"'x}. If P!j • x is not subjectively possible, 
kf k* 
then PA = PA
2 for all k1, k2
k* PA = 0 for all k not 
in L. 
E L and E PA
l 
= 1. 
f�L 
In both cases 
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First we prove a lemma that establishes a straightforward 
mechanism for calculating updated probabilities. 
Lemma 1. If the candidates A and B have probability distributions 
k k {PA}' {PB} such 
that strategy (i, j), i r j, in the game (PA' PB) 
th 
has payoffs (a, -a), if a poll is taken on the ij� element with
outcome x e {l, - l}, and if subjectively, both 1 and -1 are possible, 
the revised probabilities of the two candidates may be computed as 
follows : 
k* l".A = 0
k* 
=
 
_
_
 
2_pk PA 1 - xa B 
Pk* 0 B 
Vk e L {k!M�j = x}
Vk � L 
vk e L 
Vk + L 
Proof. Since candidates update probabilities in a Bayesian fashi9n, 
Now 
And since x2 = 1
kPA k* = --- , and P 
I: PR. A 
R.EL 
A.
a= 
= 0 
By adding 
we obtain 
or 
2 E Pk = 1 + xa
hL A 
which,. when substituted into the formula for p!*, produces the
hypothesized result. The same argument obtains for candidate B. 
Q. E.D. 
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For convenience let tij denote the true outcome of the
contest between i and j. For example, tij = 1 means that platform
i beats platform j. We continue to assume that tij = 1 or -1 for
all i r j and that tii = 0 for all i. 
Theorem 3.-1 If (i, j) is a pure strategy equilibrium with payoff
_/Theorem 3 and its corollary are stated in terms of one 
candidate, but owing to the symmetry assured betw�en the two 
candidates, they are obviously true for the other as well. 
(a, -a), a public poll on (i, j) will increase the value of the 
campaign to candidate A only if there are post-poll equilibria 
(r, s) and (t, u), depending on the poll outcome, that have the 
property that Prob A(trs = -1, tij = 1) + Prob A(ttu = -1, tij = -1)
1 - a < -2- , where Prob A(z) means A's subjective, ex ante probability
that z will transpire, 
Proof, Let L(i, j) 
L(i, j) 
{k!Mk .,. l} ij 
{k!Mk = -1}ij 
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From the way probabilities are updated by the candidates, the result 
of the poll will be to tell the candidates that the true state of the 
world is in L(i, j) or L(i, j). Let (r, s) be a post-poll 
strategy equilibrium if tij "' 1 ,  Then
and 
By Lemma 1 
Now 
E pk*M k < E pk*M �
keL(i,j) B. rs - keL(i,j) B rs
•fr 
E pk*M k = _2 _ E P� k
keL(i,j) A rs 1 + a keL(i,j) A rs
E pk = 1 + a _ 0 
keL(i,j)nL(r,s) A 2 
f � 0 i b L 1 h k L(i j) i l +a·or some u � s nee, y emma , t e sum over e , s -2� 
Hence E Pk = o = Prob A(t = -1, t = +l) • 
keL(i,j)fiL(r,s) A rs .ij 
so that E P� k = 1 + a - 20 
• 
keL(i,j) A rs 2 . 
Repeating the same argument, if tij = -1,
t P� k = 1 - a _ 28
keL(i,j) A tu 2 
where E "' Prob A(ttu"' -1, tij "' -1).
Therefore, if the poll is taken, A expects to receive 
1 + a 2o + 1 - a - 2€ "' 1 - 2o - 2€ • -2-- 2 
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If this quantity exceeds a, his expected reuttn without a poll, then 
1 - a o+E < -2- , 
Q. E. D. 
Corollary 3.1. If (i, j) is a pure strategy equilibrium with payoff 
(a, -�), then a poll on (m, n) will increase the value of the 
campaign to candidate A only if there are post-poll equilibria (r, s) 
and (t, u) that have the property 
1 - a 
Prob A(trs "' -1, t�h = 1) = Prob A(ttu = -
1, tmn = -1) < -2- • 
�· First, note that 
E Pk= 1 +a+ y A 2 keL(m,n) 
for some y e {- 1 ; a , 1 2 <!) . 
Proceeding as in Theorem 1, since 
E pk ,. 1 + a + y _ 0 • A 2 keL(m,n)fiL(r,s) 
for some o � O, then 
(7) 
Similarly, 
so that 
and hence 
(8) 
Ti p\t k = 1 + ct + y - 2o
k£L(m,n) A rs 2 
k l +ct 1 -ct _Ti PA= 1 - -2- + y = -2- - y k£L(m,n) 
Ti Pk = 1 -ct _ y _ e
k£L(m,n)fiL(t,u) A 2 
Ti p\t k = 1 - ct _ y _ 2e 
k£L(m,n) A tu 2 
Hence the ex ante expected payoff to A if a poll is to be taken 
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is just 'as in Theorem 3, since the y's cancel in the sum of (7) and 
(8). 
Q, E,D . 
Theorem 3 and its corollary indicate that, in a situation 
in which' there are pre- and post-poll strategy equilibria, if 
candidate A expects to be made better off by a poll, certain joint 
probabilities must be "small. 11 1 -ct I Since -2- is A s subjective
.Probability that A will lose if no poll is taken, the theorem and' 
its corollary reduce to an algorithm for computing the desirability 
of a poil by partiti�ning the state-of-the-world matrices according 
to which will ·be relevant under each poll outcome, calculating the 
ou.tcome under each circumstance assuming an equilibrium strategy 
is adopted, and computing the sum of these outcomes weighted by 
�he subjective, ex ante probability that the corresponding poll 
result· will transpire. Thus, Prob A(trs = -1, tmn = 1) is the
weighted sum of elements trs in the subset of matrices ·for which
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tmn is +l, weighted by the ex ante probabilities that each matrix
is the true state of the world, and Prob A(ttu = -1, tmn = -1) is
a similar calculation from the subset of matrices for which t 
= 
-1. mn 
We can give another result that does not depend on there 
being a post-poll pure strategy equilibrium. 
Theorem 4. If (i, j) is a pre-poll pure strategy equilibrium with 
payoff (a, -$), a poll on (i, j) can increase the expected value 
of the campaign to both candidates only if 
1. � strategies (r, s) and (t, u) which, if adopted when 
tij = 1 or -1, respectively, have a total expected payoff exceeding
ct + $. 
2. Either 
and 
3. 
(A) 1 - ct Prob A(trs = -1, tij = 1) +- Prob A(ttu "' -1, tij = .-1) < -2-
or 
(B) P b ( ) 1 - $ ro B trs = 1, tij = 1 + Prob B(ttu = 1, tij = -1) < -2--
The sum of (A) and (B) is less than 1 a + $2 
Proof. Ill Is obvious. 
02 Consider the two candidates jointly maxilllizing payoffs, 
The maximum joint payoff that can be obtained with a poll is 
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1) I: M-� pk*l 
kEL(i,j) rs BJ 
G ( 1) . I: k pk** p ( = -1) I: M-� pkB**l +�a� PA tij = - - Mtu A - B tij ke-L(i,j) tu J t,u keL(i,j) 
Now V* > a + 13 > payoff to A exceeds a or the payoff to B exceeds
-13. Applying Theorem 3, if the expected payoff to A exceeds a, (A) 
must hold. The same argument holds for B, establishing #2,
.f13 Let (r1'. s) and (t, u) maximize the expression for V*. 
The payoff to A is 
v * =· I: P� k + I: P� k • 1 - 20 - 2e
A ket.(i,j) A rs L(i,j) A tu 
by Theorem 3.
By the Sllll\e argument the payoff to B is 
* 
VB = -(1 2y - 2p) 
* * * V = VA - VB > a + 13 > 
2 - 20 - 2e - 2y - 2p > a + 13 
or o + € + y ·+ p > a ; 13 • 
The symbols on the left are simply the joint probabilities in #3 and 
thus the theorem is proved. 
Theorem 4 supplies us with some conditions which, if violated, 
imply that at least one candidate will not be made better off by a .· 
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th public poll on the (i, j)� element, where (i, j) is the pre-poll
pure strategy equilibrium, We do not give theorems for more general 
situations here but it �eems that similar results could be easily 
obtained, The conditions in Theorem 4 amount to saying that if the 
candidates "disagree enough" so that a and 13 are near 1, at least 
one will not want to have a public poll. 
The reason that this phenomenon occurs seems clear, If 
candidates A and B have two different prior distributions on the 
states of the world, the candidates think that a public poll will 
reveal more information to the opponent than to themselves and 
thereby will induce the opponent to change strategy from the present 
poor choice to one based on better information. 
While candidates frequently express hostility to public 
opinion polls, most candidates for major office spend a good deal 
of money generating information on public preferences through
privately commissioned polls. In his 1968 campaign, Richard Nixon 
employed the Opinion Research Corporation to conduct "opinion
panels" in fourteen states in addition to several 11,spot.11 surveys
duri.ng the election to test public reaction to new issues. When 
all the costs were totaled the Nixon polling effort in 1968 allegedly
cost more than $200,000, It would be strange, indeed, to find that
major candidates would spend such sums on opinion research if they
felt that it would not be beneficial.
Theorem 5, A private poll cannot reduce the expected value of the 
campaign to the candidate who receives the information. 
Proof, Let x and y be the optimal mixed strategies of A and B 
without a poll. Then XPAy .'.: x'PAY for all z such that x > 0 and
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I:xi = 1. The expected payoff to A is  VA= x'PAY' Suppose a poll is
th to be taken on the ij� element. Then the value of the election to
A is 
** -l)x**'PA Y
* ** where PA is the revised payoff matrix if tij = 1 and PA is . the
revised payoff matrix if tij = -1. x* and x** are A's optimal
strategies for the two situations, Using Lemma 1 we can write 
* VA as follows:
v; = x*' ( I: P�)Y + x**' ( _I: P�)y
keL(i,j) k�L(i,j) 
Note that x* = x, x** = x is a feasible strategy after the poll and; 
* 
if it is substituted in the above expression, VA= VA. 
· Thus,
* VA.'.: VA.
Q.E.D. 
Now private information never hurts a candidate, but, since 
such information is costly, many candidates may not find it 
worthwhile to purchase it. One potential cost is that the poll will 
not stay private and, therefore, may reduce the value of the election 
to the candidate that purchased it. Not surprisingly Kingdon found 
that candidates for lower (and less valuable) of fices relied on 
private polls to a lesser extent than candidates for more prestigious 
positions. All of the politicians he studied relied on less expensive 
information, even though it was frequently known to provide biased
.
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estimates of various probabilities. The candidates felt, nevertheless, 
that they could "correct" these biases and come up with reasonable 
guesses about the relev·mt ,features of the election. We do not 
investigate the circumstances in which cheap but inaccurate or 
biased information will be purchased by a candidate in preference 
to polls. The methods used here could be applied to study that 
situation. 
V, DISCUSSION 
We have explicated a simple model of electoral competition 
with candidate uncertainty that illustrates the strategic complexities 
that are introduced by lack of information. The model indicates that 
uncertainty with respect to.voter preferences profoundly affects 
electoral strategies. Uncertainty can produce pure strategy equilipria 
in which candidates adopt different platforms, rather than the 
identical pure and mixed strategies of traditional theory. Furthermore, 
under some plausible condition candidates will prefer not to increase 
the amount of information available on voter respo�ses 'to campaign 
strategies • .
Perhaps the most interesting result is that if both 
candidates are sure that a given platform would defeat all 
alternative platforms and if they "disagree enough" in their beliefs 
about the likely outcomes of other possible contests, they may find 
it in their interest to conspire not to campaign on the dominant 
platform. The example we provided of this phenomenon runs counter 
in spirit to much of the work. in the theory of electoral competition.
After all, the theorems of "median dominance" e�courage the belief
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that a :,r·easonable" position will generally prevail in the sense 
that if . one alternative defeats all others, both candidates will 
adopt is as a platform. While in our model there is no necessary 
connection between candidate beliefs and the "true" majority 
dominance relation, if both candidates agree that there is a 
dominant platform, that belief probably (but not necessarily) had 
some basis in . reality , But, in just that sort of case, the 
candidates may find it desirable to collude against the will of the 
. majority. 
. It seems quite possible that candidate uncertainty explains 
why in some campaigQs politicians do not campaign on certain issues, 
even though they regard those issues to be popular within the 
electorat�. If so , .  several potentially testable propositions emerge 
that might fruitfully be examined, · In the example of a prisoner ' s  
dilemma, some sort of cooperation between candidates is necessary 
in order to achieve an outcome that is more desirable than the 
pre-poll equilibrium. The ability of candidates to agree to 
coordinate their strategies should depend on 1) how difficult 
it is for the candidates to police defections from the collusive 
.strategy ; 2) the cost of information (a candidate has an incentive 
to collect 'information which favorably alters the strategic structure 
of the game) ; 3) the ·presence of public polls that reveal information 
on public choices over which the candidates disagree; and 4) whether 
a "dominant issue" exists and is recognized by the candidates:, We 
are aware of no empirical research into collusion in two-party 
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competition but it seems that if such a phenomenon were widespread, 
and some researchers seem to think it is , the model introduced here 
may explain it. 
The model presented in this paper is obviously no more 
than a rudimentary first step towards explaining and predicitng 
candidate behavior in uncert�in situations, Our extremely simplified 
conceptual model of a campaign does not incorporate many important 
features of an actual election. We have not , for example, dealt 
with the problems of conveying issue positions, hypothetical or 
real, to the electorate or the subjects of the poll. The positions 
of candidates are assumed to be instantly promulgated at no cost to 
the candidates. No cost is associated with switching actual positions, 
so that a candidate is allowed to move around as much as he wants in 
the course of a campaign. And no difficulty arises in deriving 
useful information from hypothetical poll questions. 
Finally, while this paper is partly addressed to the question 
of how candidates value public opinion polls, it does not provide a 
complete answer , One reason that some candidates do not like polls 
has been expressed by former California Assemblyman Walter Karabian. 
Karabian introduced a bill designed to limit the use of public polls 
in elections because he felt that a poll showing that a candidate was 
far behind would limit his ability to attract support . Our model 
of the campaign is too simplified to shed light on this issue. 
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